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IN the discussion of the Statute of Frauds, both in the treatises
and in judicial decisions, the peculiar condition of the law on that
subject as existing in Pennsylvania has been much referred to, and
the reason for the interest thus shown by the profession at large,
has been the light which these local adjudications throw upon the
general subject. The first three sections of 29 Car. II., c. 3, having
for a long time been the only ones in force in that state, and only
tle seventh, eighth and a portion of the fourth having been since
added, it was necessary to analyze the statute very carefully, to
distinguish each section from every other, and to determine what
portion of the law took its s6urce from one provision, and what from
another, in order to ascertain how far English rulings applied.
When it is remarked that the lucid mind of GIBSON, to give no other
instances, devoted itself to this work through a long period of years,
the thorough sifting which the earlier decisions received and the
minute investigation which the entire statute underwent, the results
of which are to be found in the present law of Pennsylvania, must
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be acknowledged to'have a wider value tha to regulate the litigation
of the single state itself.
1. The history of the statute.
Before Iarch 21st 1772, the statute of 29 Car. II., c. 3, though
enacted prior to Penn's charter and subsequent to the settlement
of the colony, was held not to be in force in Pennsylvania, on the
ground that of such prior statutes (except those that expressly
referred to the colony) none applied which weie made during the
latter's existence as a British possession, and that at the time of
the passage of this particular law, the authority of the British
governor of New York extended in point of fact over Pennsylvania,
being by virtue of the word territories.usedin the royal charter t6
him. Such seems to be the reason of the ruling in Anwnymous, 1
Dall. 1. (See the note thereto questioning this position and putting
the decision upon the broader basis of the inapplicability of such a
statute to the circumstances of the colony.) That this is the more
correct view is confirmed by the fact that the statute was not reenacted till 1772, and then only a small portion of it. See Bell v.
Andrews, 4 Dall. 152 ; and as to British statutes applying to the
colonies, see 1 Shams. Black. Com. 108 n. ; Kent Com., 10th ed.,
535 (*473) n.
Section 1st of Act 21st March 1772 (1 Sm. L. 889, 2 Car. & Bior.
65), is in substance the sarhe as the first three sections of 29 Car.
II., the provision in the latter as' to cases "whereupon the rent
reserved * * * shall amount to two-thirds * * * of the value
* * * of the thing demised,'; being omitted (see Rawle's Smith on
Contracts, *64 n.), and there being also omitted so much of the
third section as relates to copyholds and customary interests. The
only other parts of 29 Car. II., c. 3, re-enacted in 1772, are some
(sections. 14, 15, 16 and 25) relating to judgments, executions and
intestate estates.,
In Murphy v. Hubert, 7 Penna. St. 423, Chief Justice GIBSON
said that the omission of the seventh and eighth sections of 29 Car.
IT., C. 3, was conclusive in its effect as to trusts, and that the transcriber of-the Pennsylvania statute was a lawyer is evidenced by
the masterly way in which he had consolidated the sections of the
English statute. In Mfeowell v. Oyer, 21 Penna. St. 421, Chief
Justice BLACK said that the omission of the fourth section was
See also Bowser v. Cessna, 62
deliberate and not accidental.
Penna. St. 149.
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In Rawle's Smith on Contracts p. 118 (*47) n. 1, the learned
editor expressed himself satisfied with the omission from the law of
Pennsylvania of the provision of the Statute of Frauds relating to
guaranties. See Judge JIARE to the same effect in Birkmyr v.
Darrell,1 Sm. Lead. Cases, 5th Am. ed. 889 (the passage being
omitted in the later editions of the work); see contra, Jack v.
11orrison, 48 Penna. St. 113. In 8Stidwell v. -Evans, 1" Penna.
(P. & W.) 885, on the contrary, GIBSON, 0. J., said: "T h e mischief
produced by the want of a provision in our Act of Assembly similar
to that in the Statute of Frauds by which a parol promise to pay
the debt of another is void has induced the courts to lean against a
recovery whenever the precise terms of the promise are not explicitly
shown by clear and satisfactory proof." In Pugh v. Good, 3 W.
& S. 57, Judge GIBSON expressed himself as of the opinion that
the fourth section of 29 Car. II., so far as it related to land, should
have been held to be in force in Pennsylvania.
The English decisions made prior to the Revolution in regard to
the first three sections of 29 Car. II., were regarded by Judge
GIBSON, in Jones v. Peterman, 3 S. & R. 543, as binding upon him.
See lP'iuq v. Good, 3 W. & S. 58 ; Reed v. Reed, 12 Penna. St.
120; Parley v. Stokcs, 1 Parsons 429.
By the Act of 26th April 1855 (Pamph. L. 808), sect. 1, so
much of the fourth section of 29 Car. II. as relates to guaranties
and to promises by executors to answer out of their own estates, was
substantially re-enacted. By the Act of 22d April 1856 (Pamph.
L. 533), sect. 4, the seventh and eighth sections of 29 Car. II.
relating to trusts, are re-enacted almost verbatim. By sect. 5 of
the same Act of 1856, so much of the fourth section of 29 Car. II.
as related to contracts for the sale of land was re-enacted, but this
section (5th) was repealed by Act of 13th May 1857 (Pamph. L.
500). In Dunzars v. Miller, 34 Penna. St. 323, Judge WOODWARD
said this fifth section was well considered and was repealed without
due consideration. In .Ewing v. Thompson, 66 Penna. St. 382,
Judge READ regretted the repeal of this section.
Sect. 4 of Act of 22d April 1855 is prospective: Linge2tfelter
v. Ritcley, 58 Penna. St. 4,08; Ballentine v. White, 77 Id. 20;
See also M3offitt v. Rynd, 09 Id. ;87.
Sect. 6 of Act of 22d April 1856, provides that "no right of
entry shall accrue or action be maintained for a specific performance
of any contract for the sale of real estate, or for damages for non-
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compliance with any such contract, or to enforce any equity of
redemption after re-entry made, for condition broken, or to enforce
any implied or resulting trust as to realty, but within five years
after such contract was made, or such equity or trust accrued with
the right of entry, unless such contract shall give a longer time for
its performance, or there has been in part a substantial performance,
or such contract, equity of redemption, or trust shall have been
acknowledged by a writing to subsist by the -party to be charged
therewith within the same period ;" with a provision that in the
case of fraud the time shall only begin to run from the discovery
of the fraud.
2. The action of damagesfor the breach of a parol contract for
the sale of land.
As a consequence of the omission of the fourth section of 29 Car.
II., it has been held in Pennsylvania, from a very early day to the
present time, that though the Act of 1772 forbade the transfer of
estates in land except by a writing, a parol contract of sale was not
void, and that an action of damages lay for the breach of such an
engagement '(Bell v. Andrews, 4 Dall. 152) ; the court saying that
the only effect of the Pennsylvania statute was to restrict the operation of the agreement as to the acquisition of an interest in land.
In Ewing v. Tees, 1 Binn. 450, TILGIHMAN, C. J., said, that at
nisi prius several such actions for damages had been allowed. In
Whitehead v. Carr, 5 Watts 368, IlusToN, J., said * * * "It is
a grave question in what case and under what circumstances an
action (i. e. for breach of a parol contract to sell land) will lie."
In George v. Bartoner, 7 Watts 532, it was said by the court that
"It is unnecessary to depend on Bell v. Andrews or Ewing v.
Tees for a consequence so plain as that an action may be maintained on an unexecuted parol contract for the purchase and sale
of land; we have not re-enacted the fourth section of 29 Car. II., c.
3, which forbids it, and the provisions of the three sections condensed
by our statute into one merely operate upon the estate. We might
as well doubt whether an action could be maintained on a parol contract of marriage; should the jury attempt to enforce the contract by
damages given as a penalty, it would be the duty of the court to prevent it, as in Irvine v. Bull, 4 Watts 289." Pattisonv. Horn, 1
Grant's Cases 302 (holding however that specific execution of a parol
contract for the sale of land will not be decrecl); Bevnder v. Bender,
17 Penna. St. 419; illoore v. Small, 19 Id. 461; KYurtz v. Cum-
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mings, 24 Id. 35, affirm Bell v. Andrews and .whzg v. Tees.
In Pugh v. aood, 3 W. & S. 57, Judge GIBSON doubted whether
the prohibition of a parol contract for the sale of land, as far as such
a contract has been prohibited in Pennsylvania, can well rest on the
first section of the Statute of Frauds as adopted.
Before going into a consideration of the method of applying this
doctrine, what damages may be recovered in such an action, how
it is affected by the Statute of Limitationsi etc., we stop to ascer"tain how far the right we are speaking of is peculiar to Pennsylvania. In -wnhg v. Thompson, 66 Penna. St. 383, Judge READ
said that it was unknown out of that state. In Welch v. Lawson,
32 Miss. 170, the court held that for trouble and loss of time and
expense incurred by one under a parol contract invalid because of
the Statute of Frauds, compensation would be decreed in equity,
but none for the loss of the bargain. Bell v. Andrews, supra, was
cited by counsel, with cases to effect that for expenses incurred on
the faith of a parol contract, as for example, improvements made,
equity will decree compensation; see also Sutton v. Sutton, 13 Vt.
71; Reynolds v. Johnston, 13 Texas 214; Merithew v. Andrews,
44 Barb. 200 ; Richards v. Allen, 17 Me. 296 ; Battle v. Rochester Gity Bank, 15 Barb. 414; Lee v. Howe, 27 Mo. 521; Gupton v. Gupton, 37 Mo. 46; Jervis v. Smith, Hoff. Ch. 470. See
Pugh v. Good, supra, where it was said that notwithstanding the
fourth section of the Statute of Frauds, compensation for acts of
part performance done under an invalid parol contract could as
easily be obtained in England as in Pennsylvania. See Browne
on Statute of Frauds, § 118 et seq., and § 124; Agnew on Statute
of Frauds, pp. 118, 156-8, 229. See the arguments of counsel in
Welch v. Lawson, for cases cited as showing that fraud will lay
ground for an action in spite of the Statute of Frauds; see also
Lillard v. Casey, 2 Bibb 459, and Montague v. Garnett, 3 Bush
297, where an action to partially enforce an invalid parol contract
for the sale of goods was sustained. In Couch v. leeker, 2 Conn.
302, there was endorsed on a promissory note a condition to the
effect that if the defendant, the maker of the note, should stand to
his agreement, which was in parol, to sell the plaintiff, the holder
of the note, a certain farm, the note was to be void, otherwise not;
it was held that though a recovery on the note was in substance
giving damages for the breach of a parol contract for the sale of land,
yet that the plaintiff could show that the bargain concerning the
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land had not been complied with, and so recover on the note.
These are, as far as the present writer knows, the only analogies
to the Pennsylvania doctrine. In Ballard v. Bomd, 32 Vt. 55, it
was held that an action of damages for the breach of a parol contract would not lie, and in cases too numerous to mention the same
rule has been made by implication.
In'Poormanv. Kilgore, 37 Penna. St. 311, it was held that the
evidence in an action for the breach of a parol contract for the sale
of land must be clear, satisfactory and unambiguous.
In Postlethwaite v. Prease, 31 Penna. St. 472, the query was
made probably without any good reason, whether the compensation
for the breach -ofan invalid parol contract might not be had by a
conditional verdict in ejectment.
In Tiurston v. Branklin College, 16 Penna. St. 154, it was held
that this right of action will accrue when the vendor conveys to a
stranger and exists before an eviction by the grantee.
In Ewing v. Tees, 1 Binn. 450, it was said that an action for the
breach of a parol contract for the sale of land must be begun within
six years (now by Act of 22d April 1856, sect. 6, Pamph. L. 583,
five years). In Poormanv. Kilgore, supra, it was held that the
fact that an attempt to have- a parol contract for the sale of land
specifically enforced has been judicially decided against, is no bar
to the action for damages.
In Peasonv. Kaine, 67 Pennha. St. 181, it was held that, where
one who sued on a contract for the sale of land for a certain difference
of price which he lost by the defendant's defiult, and was, owing
to the Statute of Frauds, held not entitled to recover on the contract,
he could amend and sue for damages for the breach of contract, the
alteration not being a substantial change in the cause of action and
one therefore allowed by the Pennsylvania law of amendments.
In Gangwer v. Frj, 17 Penna. St. 495, it was held that damages
for the breach of a special unexecuted parol contract for the sale of
land cannot be recovered under counts for goods sold and delivered
or money had and received.
The last and most important question arising under the present
head is that of the measure of damages.
In Irvine v. Bull, 4 Watts 289, it was held that a conditional
verdict giving the plaintiff who sues for the breach of a jparol contract relating to land, large damages, to be released upon the defend%ntgiving the plaintiff a deed for the land, would not be sustained
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by the court, a judgment for actual damages being all that the plaintiff can obtain in such al action. It should be noted that such a
conditional verdict as the above was formerly in 1'ennsylvania the
nicans by which, in default of chancery powers, the courts being
merely common-law courts, though 'administering equitable principles, accomplished the ends for which a decree for specific performance, injunction, etc., are the appropriate machinery.
A certain amount of confusion has arisen in Pennsylvania in
regard to the question how far in an action for the breach of a parol
contract the vendor or vendee can recover for the loss of the bargain.
Two early cases, llet v. Paxson,2 W. & S. 433, and Sedan v. Shaffer, 5 Id. 524, by the generality of their language would seem to countenance a notion that the true measure of damages was the difference
between the market value of the land at the time of the breach and
the contract price, whether in the shape of a loss to be reimbursed
to the vendor by a vendee who has refused to take the property, as
in Ellet v. Pax.ion, or in a profit realized by the defendant who
was to buy for himself and the plaintiff, which profit lie refused to
let the plaintiff have, as in Sedam v. iS'haffer. This is apparently
compensation for the loss of the bargain, the recovery of which has
always been persistently denied except in some special instances to
be noticed in a moment. We shall consider, first, exactly what
Milet v. Paxson mid Sedam v. Sihaffer decide; secondly, what are
those exceptional instances in which damages for the loss of the
bargain can be recovered. We think it will be seen as to the first
head, that the result of 9,llet v. Paxson and Sedam v. Shaffer is
to allow compensation for the loss of the bargain; as to the second
head that the exceptional instances are, first, where the action is
against a defendant who has failed to comply with his bid at a public
sale for the difference in price brought on a re-sale, and second,
where there has been actual fraud on the defendant's part in not
complying with his contract, a fraud which must consist in something more than the mere fTilure to comply with his contract, even
though lie be able so to comply; and that further, the facts of let
v. Paxson and S'dam v. Shaffer do not come within these two
exceptions. And thirdly, that there are Pennsylvania cases not
only upholding these exceptions strictly, and strictly defining the
word " fraud ;" but some which seem by implication to iegative
the doctrine of Bliet v. Paxrson, etc.
To give the cases in the above order, we begin with .Ellet v. Pax-
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so, 2 W. & S. 433, in which it was held that in an action for the
breach of a parol contract for the sale of land, the vendor cannot
recover the whole amount of the purchase-money, as that would be
equivalent to specific performance (see Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Penna.
St. 426); but that the most the plaintiff could recover was damages
"equal to the loss actually sustained by the non-fulfilment of the
contract, which in this case would appear, "said the court, "from the
evidence, to be the difference between the value -of the property at
the time the defendant refused to fulfil the contract and the sum
agreed to be paid as the price of it." Following iii the same lead
we have next Sedam v. Shaffer, 5 W. & S. 524, in which it was
held that where the plaintiff and defendant agreed by parol, that
upon a consideration which was performed by the former, the latter
should buy land, and if he should sell it above a certain price, the
difference was to go to the plaintiff, it was held that while an action
for money had and received, and for specific performance of the contract by a decree that the amount of the difference between the sum
mentioned in the contract and that actually brought by the land
when sold should be paid the plaintiff under the contract,-did not
lie, yet that an action in disaffirmance of the contract for its breach
would do so in Pennsylyania, and the measure of damages was the
aforesaid difference. As confirming these cases, see the remarks of
Judge STRONG in Hoy v. Gronoble, 84 Penna. St. 11, to the effect
that profits to be made direcily from the transaction are to be taken
into consideration.
Under the second head, we have first the case of a failure to
comply with a bid at a public sale. In Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Penna.
St. 149, where the defendant's default was in not complying with
his bid made at a public sale, it was said by Judge SRARSWOOD, in
giving the opinion, that " Itis well settled that the damages to be
recovered (on a parol contract for the sale of land) is the difference between the value of the property at the time of the breach
and the sum agreed on as the price: llet v. Paxson, vide supra,
** * . It is true that where a vendor, not wilfully and fraudulently,
but because unable to make title, has not fulfilled his contract, the
vendee can only recover what he may have paid and the expenses
to which he has been subjected, but not the damages sustained by
the loss of his bargain (Dumars v. -iller,supra), but that is not
because the contract is by parol. The same rule applies to written
contracts, and depends upon different principles * * *. The
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objection of want of mutuality of remedy has therefore no application.
The rule" (i. e. of fixing as damages for the failure to comply with
a contract of sale, the difference in price as shown on a re-sale), the
learned judge added, "has been universally acted upon in reference
to the sale of chattels, and the Statute of Frauds being out of the
way, there is no reason why the harmony of the systeni should
not be preserved by resorting to it also in the sale of realty ;"
cases being cited. In Ashcorn v. ,Rmith, 2 Penna. (P. & W.) 211,
which was an action against one who failed to comply with his bid
made at a public sale, to recover the difference between his bid
aforesaid and the amount brought by the land at a re-sale: said
GiBsoN, C. J., "where the vendor has acted bona fide and with
reasonable care the measure of damages is the difference of price on
the re-sale. But his conduct may be so grossly improper as to cast
a loss from it upon him, as when the re-sale is wantonly delayed
* * *
But mere unskilfulness, without mala fides, or even negligence, unless it be plain and palpable, will not be sufficient to charge
him." See Tomlkinzs v. Has,2 Penna. St. 75, to the same effect.
Leaving this, we come to the second consideration under the
second head, that, nanely' of fraud, and have first, Rohr v. Xindt,
3 W. & S. 568, in which it was said that if the defendant being
unable to make title under his contract, gave notice to the plaintiff,
the measure of damages would be the actual loss and damage suffered
by the plaintiff under the contract and because of its breach. In
Bitner v. Brough, 11 Penna. St. 139, it was held that where a
defendant in good faith is unable to make title under a parol contract he is liable to the plaintiff for the money paid by the latter
together with interest and expenses, but that if, however, the defendant acts in bad faith, the plaintiff is entitled not only to compensatory
damages, but to damages arising from the loss of the bargain or the
money he might have derived from the completion of the contract,
but to no vindictive or exemplary damages. Hoy v. G-ronoble,
84 Penna. St. 11, follows Bitner v. Brough, in allowing damages
for the loss of the bargain and disallowing vindictive damages;
authorities being cited. Judge STRONG said that the profits to be
made directly from the transaction, are to be considered to be in
the immediate contemplation of the parties to a contract, and if not
speculative are not consequential (see Bowser v. Cessna, suiera,
and .fMeason v. Kaine, infra). In Ale loury v. Croghan, 81
VOL. XXV.-74
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Penna. St. 22, it was held that where a vendor owing to a defect
in the title and through no default or bad tith 'of hig own is
unable to make title, he is liable in an action on a parol contract
for the sale of land only in nominal daliuages for the loss to the.
vendee- of the. bargain; and that where the vendor has been in
default or shown bad faith lie is liable for the subsequent difference in the value of the land, but not where he is simply unable to
make title. In MeNair v. Comptoi, 35 Penna. St. 28, Judge
WOODWARD said that'as against afraudulent vendor it was reasonable that damages should be given to compensate for all the expenses
in which his, the defendant's, fraud had involved the plaintiff. (See
'5ilson v. Clarke, 1 W. & S. 5552 as to actions against such vendors.) In ileason v. Kane,63 Penna. St. 339, it was held that
where three agree by parol to buy land and one of them refuses to
pay his share, the measure of daniages would be the difference
between the price he agreed to pay and the present market value
of the land; cases being cited. See, h6wever, for the ground of
fraud on which this case went, and f6r an explanation of the phrase
'present market value," JRfeason v. Icaine, 67 Penna. St. 131,
infra.
And next, as to what constitutes such fraud as is raised in these
cases, we have J11feason v. IKaine, 6 Penna. St. 131, in which it
was held that where one of three persons who had by parol agreed
to buy land, sued another of the three, the plaintiff having in
accordance with the parol contract purchased the land, the measure
of damages was not the defendant's quota of the purchase-money,
for that would be to specifically enforce the trust subsisting between
the parties, and which under the Act of 22d April 1856, being
express could not be proved by parol, and would moreover violate
the equitable doctrine of mutuality of remedy (see infra). It was
further said that in the absence of fraud nothing can be recovered
for the loss of a parol bargain, but compensation only for the actual
loss sustained, such as'the payment of money, &c., and for expenses
incurred on the faith of the bargain. But that it was fraud in a
defendant to induce the plaintiff to buy on a promise that lie, the
defendant, would participate in the purchase, thus leading the plaintiff to change his position and incur heavy responsibility which the
bar of the Statute of Frauds preventing specific performance only
intensified. That the phrase "present market value" of the land,
used in Hlfeason v. Kfaine, 67 Penna. St. supra, meant the value at
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tile jine of the final breach of the contract and not at the time of
the trial ; cases being cited. In Blarris v. 11arris,70 Penna. St.
174, it was said that the only fraud on the vendor's part is in the
o.a/ital contrat, icre thilure to convey, though the vendor be able
to convey, is not such fraud ; thus negativing the suggestion made
ith more or less directness in 1?(ohr v. .Kndtt, Bitner v. Brough,
IIy v. Gronoble, d][cloury v. Croghan, Bowser v. Cessna, all
sujlra, to the effect that the wilful default in not complying with
his contract on the part of a defendant who is able to comply, if
he chooses, is an element in the compensation for the loss of the
bargain, or is a reason for giving any other damages than those for
the loss which the plaintiff has actually suffered. See Browne on
the Statute of Frauds, § 429, et seq.
The exception made in favor of a bid at a public sale, it may be
added, seems founded on the fact which the courts can hardly fail
to recognise, of the nature'of an auction sale in which the bids are
a fair and natural gauge of what the .land woulhj have actually.
brought to its owner, the plaintiff, if the defendant had not by first
making a bid amd then refusing to comply with it; entailed upon
the plaintiff the loss for 'hich lie sues; the difference between the
defendant's bid and the price on a re-sale, represents the money
which the plaintiff would have had but for the defendant's action,
whereas when in the case of a private sale the defendant sues for
the difference between the market price of the land at the time of
the breach, and the amount of the defendant's offer, it does not
follow that but for the defendant and his contract the plaintiff could
ever have obtained so good an offer; non constat, that any one else
would have valued the land so highly or that the land was worth
what the defendant was willing to give for it. Even in cases where
evidence might be offered to show that but for the defenlant's interference the plaintiff could have sold the land to others at the price
offered by the defendant, the court might well refuse to go into such
consideration as being too uncertain and remote, and confine the
recovery for such loss of bargain to the exception of a public sale,
where, as has been suggested, the worth of the land is so simply
and effectually tested as that the ]awr will take notice of the fact.
The exception in favor of damages for the loss of a parol bargain
where the defendant has been guilty of fraud depends, as was aptly
indicated'by Judge SHARswooD in Boirser v. Cessna, supra, upon
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general considerations irrespective of the Statute of Frauds. See
Field on Damages, § 479 et seq., § 484 et seq.
Lastly, as cases which lay down a rule which would appear to
exclude such a recovery as was allowed in .Ellet v. Paxson, and
Sedam v. Shaffer, we have Dumars v. MAiller, 34 Penna. St. 323,
in which it was held that in the absence of fraud the plaintiff in
an action for the breach of a parol contract for the sale of land,
cannot recover the value of the bargain, and that the consideration,
if it has been paid, must be returned with interest, and expenses
incurred must be re-imbursed. In Bendtr v. Bender, 17 Penna.
St. 419, in an action for the breach of a parol contract for the sale
of land, it was held that the damages were " compensation for all
that the plaintiff below did in pursuance of the contract and in satisfaction of his part thereof and for all permanent improvements
made upon the land in reliance upon the contract with the knowledge of the defendant and which the defendant gets the benefit of
by taking back the land, deducting the value of the rents and- profits
of the land during the plaintiff's occupancy :" see Harrisv. Harris,
supra. In Ewing v. Thompson, 66 Penna. St. 383, Judge READ said
"1By our law such an action (i. e. on a parol contract for the sale
of land) may be sustained, but the measure of damages is the
actual consideration between the parties; if the consideration were
services rendered, they are to be compensated according to their
value; if moneys received they ure to be returned with interest, but
the value of the bargain is not the measure."
We come now to the last point under this general head of the
measure of damages, viz., what are the damages where the parol
contract has been to reward the plaintiff's services to the defendant
by the conveyance of certain land. It was at first held in Jack v.
McKee, 9 Penna. St. 245, Judge ROGERs relying on a dictum of his
own in BZohr v. Kindt, 3 W. & S. 563, that the measure was the
value of the'land, and not merely the value of the services: Bash
v. Bash, 9 Penna. St. 260 ; .Malaun's Adm'r v. Ammon, 1 Grant
131 (see an" able dissenting opinion by Judge WOODWARD); MClintock v. Beach, cited in 1 Grant 145; McDowell v. Oyer,
21 Penna. St. 421 (in which BLACK, C. J., in a forcible opinion,
said that the doctrine of Jack v. MYelfe was one long known to
the Common Pleas in certain parts of the state), follow Jack v. .11eKee. See also, as apparently in favor of Jack v. M1eKee, to a
greater or less degree, Basford v. Pearson,9 Allen 390; H7orn v.
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Goodrich, 37 N. II. 185 (where the court said that the value of
the land did not fix the damages, but that in estimating these, the
jury might take into consideration such value); Thomas v. .Dickinson, 14 Barb. 90; ones v. Homer, 2 Hilt. 116; -Xing v. Brown,
2 Hill 485; Clark v. Terry, 25 Conn. 395; see, however, In8k v.
Sherman, 25 Barb. 433 ; Erben v. Lorillard,19 N. Y. 299 ; Emery
v. Smith, 46 N. II. 151; Fuller v. Reed, 38 Cal. 99; Browne on
Stat. of Frauds, § 125.
In 11,rtzog v. ltertzog, 34 Penna. St. 419, Jack v. McKee,
and its train of dependent cases, were overruled by an unanimous
court, and it was held that the early rule was to be adhered to;
namely, that the damages in an action for a breach of a parol contract relating to land were merely compensation for what had been
paid and done on the footing of the contract and were to put the
parties where they were before the contract was made. The unjust results of the ruling in Jack v. McKee were said to have been
very palpable.
Among the earlier cases referred to in Hertzog v. tfertzog, the
following throw, perhaps, the greatest light on the disputed point.
In Ewing v. Tees, 1 Binn. 450, 0. J. TILGHMAN said that, ** *
"an action for damages for not performing a contract is of much
less moment" (than an action by which title to land should be transferred) ; "the jury may give such damages as under the circumstances of each case appears reasonable, and these damages will often
be very small, and there is less danger because they must be com-'
menced within six years (vide supra)." In 1 Smith's Laws of Pennsylvania 397, said the annotator, quoting Eving v. Tees, "But if
in the mere case of a parol contract the jury could in any case be
induced to give exemplary damages beyond the actual loss or injury
or the difference in price on a second sale, the act * * * might
then become a dead letter. If under the pressure of heavy damages the party could in such cases be deprived of what is called the
locus panitentiw, and on the one hand be compelled to convey, or
on the other to acccept of the purchase, having damages against him
to the amount of the contract according as the jury may view the
circumstances of the case, the distinction would then be without a
difference and the absence of the fourth section of the Statute of
Frauds be a serious inconvenience ;" see for cases cited and distinguished. In Pfeifer v. Landis, 1 Watts 329, in an action of
ejeetment on a parol contract to reward services with the convey-

